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ABSTRACT  
   
Principle-based ethical frameworks, which commonly make use of codes of 
ethics, have come to be the popular approach in guiding ethical behavior within scientific 
research. In this thesis project, I investigate the benefits and shortcomings of this 
approach, ultimately to argue that codes of ethics are valuable as an exercise in 
developing a reconciled value profile for a given research community, and also function 
well as an internal and external proclamation of values and norms. However, this 
approach results in technical adherence, at best, and given the extent to which scientific 
research now irreversibly shapes our experience as human beings, I argue for the 
importance of cultivating ethical virtues in scientific research. In the interest of doing so I 
explore concepts from Aristotelian virtue ethics, to consider how to ameliorate the 
shortcomings of principle-based approaches. This project was inspired by a call to 
research and develop an ethical framework upon which to found a cooperative research 
network that would be aimed at combating the spread of emerging and re-emerging 
infectious diseases in resource-restricted countries, specifically throughout Latin 
America. The desire to found this network on an ethics-based framework is to move 
beyond technical compliance and cultivate a research community committed to integrity, 
therefore establishing and maintaining trust and communication that will allow for 
unprecedented productive collaboration and meaningful outcomes. I demonstrate in this 
thesis that this requires more than a code of ethics, and use this initiative as a case study 
to exhibit the merit of integrating concepts from virtue ethics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In global health, there is a popular, well-intentioned belief that scientific and 
technological solutions can deliver remedies, even in complex situations plagued by 
broken, inadequate infrastructure and frustrating social factors. However, this belief is 
acutely problematic in international health research, and this is well-evidenced in the 
cases the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic in Western Africa, and most recently by 
the Zika virus (ZIKV) spread from Latin America into the U.S. In these scenarios power 
and resource asymmetries abound, and the devastating repercussions of failures to 
collaborate and failures to adequately consider social and ethical dimensions are made 
evident (Heymann et al., 2016; Shuchman et al., 2014; O’Connor et al., 2016; Yozwiak et 
al., 2016). 
Not long after ZIKV was declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
director-general to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), top 
research institutions across the developed world, including in the United States, began 
working to assemble teams and propose how they might compete for funding to take on 
the ZIKV challenge. In the midst of this inflammatory storm, Dr. Joe Blattman, a T-cell 
scientist here at Arizona State University, studying how the immune system responds to 
vaccination and viral infection, cast an alternative agenda:  “Why are we trying to 
assemble teams now? We are already late. This has to be done in advance of an outbreak, 
and unfortunately, there will be another. So let’s begin preparing now, and let’s do it 
right.”  
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Blattman was calling for the preemptive establishment of a multinational, inter-
institutional, interdisciplinary research collaborative network that would be devoted to 
preventing the spread of emerging infectious diseases throughout the Americas. Thus, he 
aimed to forge partnerships between Arizona State Univeristy (ASU) and resource 
restricted research sites across Central and South America, ahead of a funded project. His 
vision was radical and multilayered, but straightforward. ASU has resources that can be 
leveraged that these other countries don’t have, but have expressed interest in, such as 
access to information and journals. They have localized knowledge and local access that 
is imperative to the success of any undertaking of this nature. Both have varied levels of 
scientific expertise, and if done equitably, both have the desire to collaborate. But, in 
order for this to be equitable, Blattman was ardent that this collaborative be founded on 
and committed to an ethical framework. Only then would legitimate trust and partnership 
be built, and power imbalances among constituents be redressed, so as to enhance good 
outcomes.  
It was at this phase that I was introduced to the project. Blattman and I had first 
met when I was in my undergraduate program, while I completed two of his upper 
division courses on immunobiology. Later, while completing coursework for my Masters, 
I developed and led a discussion section for his graduate and honors students focused on 
social and ethical dimensions throughout the history of immunobiology. Now, Blattman 
was approaching me based not only on our working relationship, but also on the position 
I held in the Lincoln Center for Applied Ethics, as Applied Ethics Research Development 
Lead. He shared with me his vision and expressed his concerns. We joined forces on the 
spot, and collectively our vision evolved into establishing, sustaining and engaging 
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partnerships across the Americas with stakeholders (local researchers, NGOs, public 
sectors, media outlets, funding bodies, and foundations), so that this network, 
authentically and intentionally curated, can provide a flexible platform for teams of 
experts to form quickly around emerging problems. As a working title, we refer to the 
project as the Collaborative for Emerging Infectious and Disease Response (CEIDR). 
Blattman put forth strong sentiments about the type of culture and practices that 
he considered important for the success of this project and anticipated that an ethical 
framework was necessary in order for these cultures and practices to become 
commonplace within this research community. These include: open data sharing before 
publication, equity among collaborators regardless of nationality or affiliation, iterative 
and dynamic consideration of social and ethical issues alongside scientific and 
technological exploration, and an ongoing commitment to the development and 
dissemination of resources that are meaningful to the disease endemic populations. He 
was convinced that these are not what have come to be conventional practices, but that 
this is the way things should be done to be effective for the cause.  
In addition to how things should be, Blattman also expressed strong concerns 
about the types of practices that would not be tolerated. At the top of his list were 
“parachutist research” practices (Heymann et al., 2016), which he described as 
“parasitic.” Given the recent surge in infectious disease outbreaks, there was a growing 
discussion on this “perceived exploitation of disease-stricken countries” (Yozwiak et al., 
2016) taking form as perspective pieces, commentaries, and essays and popping up in 
well-respected journals such as Nature Medicine, Cell and the New England Journal of 
Medicine (Heymann et al., 2016; Shuchman et al., 2014; O’Connor et al.; 2016, Yozwiak 
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et al., 2016). Heymann et al. described parachute research as “fully equipped research 
teams from other countries arriv[ing] at the site where research is needed, conduct[ing] 
their research independently of others, then leav[ing].” They assert that these parachutist 
researchers actually “reduce the effectiveness of emergency responses by neglecting to 
share their data with the public health teams of the affected” (2016).  
But this manipulation of power and opportunity was not the only negligence that 
Blattman was disturbed by. He had other concerns that seemed mundane in comparison 
having to do with trust and accountability amongst collaborators. It turns out he is not 
alone with these frustrations. As I will give more attention to later in this thesis, there is a 
well developed set of studies by De Vries, Anderson and Martinson that empirically 
document day-to-day misbehaviors surrounding trust and accountability amongst 
collaborators that scientists themselves perceive to be a threat to the overall enterprise of 
science (Chubin 1985; De Vries et al., 2006; 2007). 
Armed with these concerns, my contribution to the CEIDR project was to work on 
developing the ethical framework that would undergird this collaborative effort. Blattman 
had in mind “a code of ethics, but with teeth.” And this begins the project that I will 
report on here, in this thesis. My immediate action was to conduct a preliminary literature 
review to become familiar with the climate of international health research practices, 
inequities and efforts, with special attention paid to ZIKV, because of its genesis in Latin 
America, but also on EVD in West Africa, as these at the time were the two most recent 
and well-covered outbreaks that U.S. funding and research efforts were addressing. I will 
discuss my findings from that search in chapter 4 to provide context while using CEIDR 
as a case study for my recommendations of an ethical framework.  
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Next, I conducted a literature review on codes of ethics and ethics in science, and 
on the ideal characteristics of a twenty-first century scientist. This exercise (the findings 
of which I will expand upon in chapter 1) allowed me to gain insight into the evolving 
relationship between the practice of science and ethics (and, thus, the changing roles of 
both the scientist and the ethicist), which has allowed me to appreciate that there are a 
multitude of complicated factors of influence on cultural norms within the scientific 
research community. Ultimately, I gained an understanding of how codes of ethics are 
developed, what the intended functions may be (educational, regulatory or aspirational), 
how the codes are disseminated, as well as how and whether codes are enforced by any 
sort of penalty. In doing this work, I found principle-based ethics approaches, or 
principlism, to be the popular ethical framework where codes of ethics are in use.  
Principlism is a pragmatic approach for ethical decision-making in which a set of 
principles are established and to be taken as common ground moral principles. The 
specific term and concept of principlism has been developed over the past 40 years by 
bioethicists Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, and is largely recognized—and at 
times debated for its oversimplification—within biomedical research. While these authors 
have distilled down to four distinct principles (autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, 
and justice), I see the application of these principles and to be analogous to those found in 
codes of ethics. In both instances, the practical activity is to determine how the principles 
are to be used in practice, while balancing the principles with any other moral 
obligations, a task that I will argue requires the virtue of phronêsis, or practical wisdom, 
as initially developed by Aristotle.   
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In addition to identifying principlism as the popular ethical framework for 
scientific research communities, I observed common themes across a majority of codes of 
ethics, norms and values within scientific research (Resnik, 2011; Bullock & Panicker, 
2003). What I discovered was that in many instances the codes featured criteria featured 
were less pragmatic and principled, but rather related to virtue and character. A 
straightforward example of this and one that I will draw upon for throughout this thesis is 
integrity. Other examples include honesty, fairness, carefulness, social-responsibility, and 
truthfulness (Resnik, 2011; Bullock & Panicker, 2003; Schrader-Frechette 1994; Komíc 
et al., 2013). Perplexed by the expectation that simply listing characteristics of virtue and 
character would result in actions that resembled these virtues such as integrity, my next 
step was to explore the successes and failures of principle-based approached and the use 
of codes of ethics to see if this expectation was met. I conclude chapter 1 by discussing 
benefits and values of a code of ethics, which has to do with communicating internally 
and externally the standards of ethical conduct intended to guide professional behavior 
within a defined group (Komíc et al., 2013; Resnik, 2005; Schrader-Frechette, 1994). I 
devote chapter 2 to considering the inefficiencies of codes of ethics. For this project, 
given the widespread expectation for codes of ethics to guide ethical behavior, I adopt the 
practical definition of an ineffective code found in the literature of “failing to prevent 
unethical or illegal behavior that was prohibited in the code” (Komíc et al., 2015,) and 
add to this definition that a code may also be considered ineffective if the standards of 
ethical conduct presented in the code are not widely observed or upheld by the 
community members.  
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In order to determine whether or how codes of ethics are ineffective, I turned to 
empirical studies on questionable research practices, misbehaviors and misconduct within 
scientific research communities (Chubin 1985; De Vries et al 2007; 2008). I then cross-
referenced the commonly reported behaviors within these studies with the themes that I 
discovered were common across a majority of scientific society codes of ethics.  This 
analysis not only substantiated the concerns put forth from Blattman that seemed 
mundane relating to honesty and accountability, but also overlapped with aspects of 
character and virtue having to do with integrity that I became intrigued with in my study 
of themes across codes. Therefore applying the definition of an ineffective code adopted 
for this project, be it the code itself or a principlism framework, I argue that the 
combination of the two in themselves are not an effective or complete approach for 
cultivating a research culture committed to integrity, especially when understanding 
honesty, fairness, carefulness, social responsibility, and truthfulness to be related to 
integrity. 
At this point, it is necessary to pause and acknowledge that ambiguity comes with 
the popularity and complexity of terms like “integrity.” To situate this concept for the 
scope of this project, I will draw from two diverse sources—a National Research Council 
Report and a prominent philosopher—that ultimately corroborate each other to illustrate 
that integrity is too complex to narrowly define, but that the commonly associated 
constituents of integrity, and therefore integrity as a concept, has to do with more than 
adherence, but also with virtue and character.   
In 2002, the National Academies published a report, “Integrity in Scientific 
Research: Creating an Environment that Promotes Responsible Conduct,” which was 
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produced by a committee appointed to assess integrity in research environments. This 
was a combined effort of the National Institute of Medicine and the National Research 
Council (NRC). The opening statement of this report offers perspective on the 
importance as well as the expansiveness, of integrity as a concept: 
Integrity in research is essential for maintaining scientific excellence and 
for keeping the public’s trust. Integrity characterizes both individual 
researchers and the institutions in which they work. The concept of 
integrity however cannot be reduced to a one-line definition. For a 
scientist, integrity embodies above all the individual’s commitment to 
intellectual honesty and personal responsibility. It is an aspect of moral 
character and experience. For an institution, it is a commitment to creating 
an environment that promotes responsible conduct by embracing standards 
of excellence, trustworthiness, and lawfulness… (National Research 
Council, 2003, p. 4). 
 
Here the concept of integrity is recognized as complex and several of the usual suspects 
show up—honesty, responsibility, and trustworthiness, and importantly, the NRC 
recognizes these as aspects of moral character. 
 Lynne McFall has published an important and well-regarded essay on integrity 
(McFall 1987). McFall, similar to the NRC, categorizes integrity as moral subject matter, 
but in this essay she specifically confronts the tendency to distinguish between moral and 
personal integrity, in which case it might be argued that moral integrity requires truth 
telling, honesty and fairness, while personal integrity does not (1987). McFall rejects this 
thinking, and reasons that in some instances integrity may appear to be consistent with 
deception. She gives the example of living in Nazi Germany during World War II and 
hiding a Jew in your basement, and contests that “nobody but Kant would claim that you 
suffer a loss of moral integrity if you tell the Nazi at the door that you are the only one 
home” (McFall, 1987). She also contends that regardless of how conventional one’s 
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principles may be, it is unauthentic—and therefore lacking personal integrity—for an 
individual’s relationship to those principles to be only a matter of such convention. 
Ultimately, McFall states that coherence between principle and action is necessary but 
not sufficient. Rather, she places an emphasis on the internal coherence, which involves 
motivation in addition to principle and action (McFall, 1987). 
 These perspectives allow for a clarified understanding of integrity within the 
scope of this project and support the association of integrity with virtue and character as 
opposed to with adherence or compliance. I apply this understanding to the case I make 
in chapters 2 and 3, to argue that sole reliance on codes of ethics and principlism is an 
insufficient approach to cultivate a research culture that is committed to integrity. 
Exploring virtue ethics frameworks as a possible antidote to these inefficiencies became 
the obvious next step. In doing so, I was quick to realize the expansiveness of virtue 
ethics as an object of study, as in addition to an existing dense literature there has been a 
recent surge of interest in virtue ethics frameworks. As a result, a comprehensive 
exploration was not possible for this project. However, I did find reason to want to devote 
time in the future to a more in depth examination of virtue ethics frameworks.  
For this project, I focus on Aristotelian Virtue ethics and commentaries provided 
by contemporary scholars working on virtue ethics and/or character and moral integrity in 
the practice of science. In particular, I have resonated with recent work from Jiin-Yu 
Chen (2015), a medical humanist affiliated with the Berman Institute of Bioethics at 
Johns Hopkins University. Her work examines science’s moral and social dimensions 
using virtue ethics and humanities. Drawing from Aristotelian virtue ethics, she focuses 
on the virtue phronêsis, or practical wisdom, to frame the day-to-day life of a scientist 
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within a virtue ethics framework. I devote Chapter 4 to discuss the potential value of 
virtue ethics, with an emphasis on Aristotelian virtue ethics. I conclude the chapter by 
arguing that the cultivation of phronêsis, or practical wisdom, is essential in order to 
manifest integrity, whether personally or professionally. Therefore I champion further 
exploration of virtue ethics frameworks to consider how to augment principle-based 
frameworks with virtue-based frameworks in order to realize a research culture that is 
committed to integrity. 
 In my final chapter, I use the CEIDR project as a case study, to contextualize my 
thesis: that sole reliance on codes of ethics via a principlism framework is not sufficient 
for cultivating a research culture committed to integrity, understanding integrity as 
having to do with more than technical adherence, but requires the cultivation of virtue. 
Thus, virtue ethics frameworks, at this point with particular emphasis on the concepts of 
telos and the cultivation of the virtue phronêsis are worth exploring more 
comprehensively to develop a blended framework and a practical application that 
effectively establishes, supports and sustains a research culture committed to integrity.   
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CHAPTER 2 
PRINCIPLISM AND CODES OF ETHICS: STRENGTHS 
 
In this chapter, I discuss why codes of ethics are used, how codes of ethics are 
developed and enacted, as well as the three different goals (educational, aspirational, or 
regulatory) that may be at work in any combination within a given code. I also discuss 
the relationship between principlism and the use of codes of ethics, specifically focusing 
on the benefits of this relationship, while ultimately acknowledging the critical reliance 
on individual interpretation of and commitment to a code of ethics, in order for 
principlism to be a sufficient framework to foster a cooperative, research community 
built on integrity. Lastly, I discuss basic tenets that I have found through meta-analyses to 
apply across a majority of scientific societies, and eventually emphasize the concept of 
integrity. I conclude by arguing that integrity, as it is derived through this analysis, relates 
to individual and institutional character and virtue. Therefore, I question whether solely 
and critically relying on interpretation of and commitment to a code, even with training in 
Responsible Conduct in Research, is appropriate. 
But first, a few clarifications on terms, scope and assumptions related to this 
project.  It is important to this project to acknowledge that the implementation of codes—
be it a code of conduct, a code of ethics, or a professional code of ethics—has become the 
preferred approach amongst research institutions for providing guidance for ethical 
behavior (Atkinson & Butler, 2012). For clarification, there are other terms used to 
describe similar, if not the same type of practice, which include legalism (Davis, 2002) 
and ethical formalism (Atkinson & Butler, 2012). Given the scope of this project, I am 
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less concerned with the distinction between these terms, so much as I am concerned with 
how much the practices have in common. With this in mind, I will continue to reference 
these types of practices using principlism as a generic term.  
Also regarding terms and scope for this project is the matter of whether science is 
a profession or should be a profession and thereby subject to professional standards, even 
accreditation. This debate is ongoing and significant, however not immediately to the 
thesis of this project, as my work here is to debate the efficacy, or lack thereof, of a 
principlism framework in cultivating a research culture that is committed to integrity. 
Regardless of the professionalism debate, scientific societies and other governing boards 
within science are currently, and have been, using codes of ethics for decades to promote 
ethical behavior and integrity in research. I have engaged literature on codes that sit on 
both sides of the professionalism debate, and I have found that they offer overlapping 
insight regarding what codes are, how they are developed, and how they are to be used. 
Furthermore, the concept of professionalism is frequently used throughout scientific 
literature, especially with regard to responsible conduct in research, research integrity, 
and scientific societies. In most cases, the term is used colloquially to distinguish a 
vetted, authoritative status in contrast to amateur status, but not bearing the full weight of 
the philosophical and/or sociological argument surrounding the categorization of a 
profession. Given the prevalence of this term, and the clarification I have provided, I will 
use the concept of professionalism here as is it used colloquially.  
Lastly I explored literature that varies as to what the code is called—code of 
conduct, code of ethics, professional code of ethics, etc. Ultimately I consider the 
intended function of the code to be the criteria most meaningful for this project. 
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Therefore, all of the works that I have drawn from for this project have common 
expectations for codes, which in sum are to guide ethical behavior and decision making 
within their respective communities. With this explained, I will use the term code, or 
code of ethics as generic terms from here forward.  
 
WHAT ARE CODES AND HOW ARE THEY BENEFICIAL? 
Codes of ethics can vary across a number of dimensions, ranging from a one-page 
document simply stating principles, to a lengthy manual detailing expectations for 
conduct. The type of code adopted is a function of the different professional roles within 
an association, as well as the association’s perceived obligations, responsibilities and own 
history (Bullock & Panicker, 2003). Given this variance, it is not surprising that there are 
many ways to define codes of ethics and their functions, just as there are many ideas as to 
how they are to be engaged. However, it is generally accepted that codes of ethics are 
formal documents sending a message about moral standards guiding ethical behavior 
within a given association (Komíc et al., 2015). Professional societies are often 
comprised of members who entered into a community of common purpose with similar 
aspirations, values and trainings. As a result the professional community is likely to 
represent a moral community, garnering major influence over the norms and definitions 
of appropriate professional conduct for its members. This places an emphasis on the 
importance of social structures in shaping individual consciences and behaviors. Thus, a 
society’s code of ethics is one of the most explicit proclamations of these norms (Frankel, 
1989).  
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Because of this, a code of ethics acts as a moral compass to the members of the 
relevant community, providing guidance to individual members. Mark Frankel is the 
recently retired program director of the Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights and Law 
Program at the American Association for Advancing Science (AAAS), and he likens a 
code of ethics to a compass in that it “provides direction but does not presume to locate 
the ultimate destination” (1989). In addition to being a compass, a code of ethics can 
serve as a source for public evaluation, communicating the self-proclaimed roles and 
values of a given society and therefore allowing the public to hold that society and its 
members accountable (1989). This can enhance the profession’s reputation and 
strengthen trust, which is important as with the current relationship between science and 
society, autonomy and status are strongly related to public perception (1989).  
A code of ethics can also aid in professional socialization, helping to foster pride 
and strengthen professional identity and allegiance within the profession (Frankel 1989). 
In this way, a code may also provide a real support system for individuals wanting to 
participate in a community that professes values and commitments that may otherwise be 
eroded by external pressures and infrastructures. Examples of external pressures relevant 
to this thesis might include: “publish or perish,” promotion and tenure processes, or other 
effects from commodification of the academic research community writ large. And in a 
similar vein, a code may act as a basis for settling disputes among members, as well as 
deterring unethical behavior (1989).  
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DEVELOPMENT OF A CODE OF ETHICS 
Given the many functions of a code of ethics, the process of developing a code of 
ethics should be executed with care, and involve a time of critical self-examination by 
both individual members and the relevant community as a whole. Of course this is easier 
said than done, and there are two aspects I would like to draw attention to that if not 
thoughtfully addressed can lead to distorted perceptions and misguide the development of 
the code. One of these is the conventional narrowness of morality within science in 
contrast to broader social values. Overlooking these differences can result in a disconnect 
from broader social values, and the implications of this disconnect may have very real 
consequences depending on the scientific society’s relationship to society and vice versa. 
While the scientific community holds dear concepts of self-regulation, autonomy and 
freedom for creativity, the extent to which these qualities exist anymore is related to the 
public’s trust, in which case the public’s perception of the scientific community’s 
motives and quality of its performance ought to be of great importance (Frankel 1989, 
Jones 2007).    
The other aspect important to consider is the consistency between the scientific 
society’s defined values, roles and functions and those perceived by the individual 
society members. If the members’ identity and experience is disparate from that 
expressed by the professional society, then a respect for the society’s ethics will erode 
and it will become acceptable among members to engage in and overlook misbehavior 
(Frankel, 1989; Heitman, 2005; Martinson, 2006).  
While working through all of these aspects of importance, there are structural 
decisions that need to be made by the relevant community about its code of ethics. In 
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general, there are three intended functions of a code of ethics, and it is not uncommon for 
one code to contain any combination of these three functions. The first type is 
aspirational, in which case the purpose is to provide a set of idealistic guidelines for its 
members to aspire to, rather than bare minimum criteria, or focusing on right versus 
wrong behavior. The second type is educational. Educational codes are used when the 
intent is to strengthen understanding of what is valued within the community, and how 
the community and its members are expected to perform. It is common for this style to 
include extensive commentary, and provide interpretations. The third type is regulatory, 
and this type, as one might imagine, functions to provide rules that must not be broken 
(therefore the bare-minimum criteria in contrast to the aspirational style of code) 
(Frankel, 1989; Bullock & Panicker, 2003).   
Another decision that must be made by the relevant community is whether or not 
the code will be enforced, and if so, how. Obviously this relates mostly to regulatory 
codes, but this can also be a decision for educational codes. And, if a society decides to 
regulate or enforce their code there is additional infrastructure that must be put in place. 
For example, there must be an oversight committee and protocols determined for 
reporting and handling of allegations. If there are enforceable criteria then the society 
must decide upon the appropriate sanctions that will be imposed, and whether there is 
interest, in addition to resources to rehabilitate offenders rather than simply reprimand 
them. Revisiting the importance of self-regulation and autonomy to the scientific 
community, if there are enforceable mandates, they are usually determined and enforced 
by the scientific society that researchers align with based on discipline or cause. This is 
because while there may be multiple levels of influence on standards of conduct—
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Declaration of Helsinki (international), the Common Rule (national), and Institutional 
Review Boards (institutional)—there are still ethical dimensions that are specific to the 
disciplinary work or cause that the society is centered around, therefore the scientific 
society level is a most appropriate level of declaring and promoting specific ethical 
behaviors (Bullock & Panicker, 2003). However, the esteem carried by associating with 
different scientific societies is variable, as in some cases association with a particular 
society is a crucially validating career factor, but in other cases, association may be 
inconsequential. Therefore, the weight of any sanction imposed will also vary.  
Now that I have provided foundational knowledge for how and why codes of 
ethics are used, how they are developed and enforced (if enforced), I shall now turn the 
discussion toward principlism as a popular framework within scientific research 
communities where codes of ethics are used.  
 
PRINCIPILISM: POPULAR, BUT SUFFICIENT?  
Principlism is a pragmatic approach for ethical decision-making in which a set of 
principles are established and taken as common ground moral principles. This particular 
concept has been developed over the past 40 years by bioethicists Tom Beauchamp and 
James Childress. The practical activity in principlism is to determine how the principles 
are to be used in practice, while balancing the principles with any other moral obligations 
(Beaucamp & DeGrazia, 2004).  This approach is similar to other frameworks that are 
commonly upheld where codes of ethics are in use, such as ethical formalism and 
legalism, in that there is a set of principles intended to guide behavior. While on the 
surface ethical formalism may be simply understood as the use of formal rules for the 
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purpose of guiding behavior generally involving penalties for non-compliance (Atkinson 
& Butler, 2012), and legalism can be understood as “simply following the rules” (Davis, 
2002), a slightly deeper understanding quickly makes obvious that either approach 
critically relies on the individual’s ability to interpret the principles and apply them in a 
way that often requires balancing multiple competing values. For this reason I see all 
three of these approaches to be similar enough in practice to treat them as the same for 
this project.    
In Profession, Code and Ethics, Michael Davis (2002) devotes almost an entire 
chapter to defending why “simply following the rules” is a sufficient expectation of any 
member of a profession. I appreciate the argument that Davis lays out, and I would like to 
summarize his main points here as I believe that his work well illustrates that if members 
are capable of interpreting and adhering to a code of ethics, then principlism (or 
specifically legalism in Davis’ argument) is a satisfactory approach for coordinating, 
promoting, and practicing ethical behavior within a professional society. 
In defense of “just following the rules,” Davis argues that the only instances where this 
isn’t sufficient, the rules aren’t actually being followed—rather, misinterpreted. To 
demonstrate the ways rules can be misinterpreted and therefore not followed he maps out 
five different misinterpretations (listed below). He concludes that as long as the rules are 
being interpreted properly and followed, that just following the rules is “just acting as a 
responsible professional,” and in relationship to this the “role of virtues are secondary” 
(2002).  
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1. Following the Rules Blindly or Strictly 
Davis asserts that teaching someone to follow a rule is teaching what the rule is (2002). 
This interpretation of just following the rules represents instances where “mere rule 
following is doing what the rule says without concern for context or confidence, a 
mechanical or blind obedience” (2002). Davis argues that this type of obedience is 
actually rare to find in adults, as it leaves the interpretation of the rule up to others. 
Examples where this can be seen are in military settings, or perhaps settings of hierarchy 
where a judge might defer to the decision made by a higher court. However, Davis argues 
that this is not following the rules, but is more appropriately to be understood as “obeying 
orders” or “following a controlling precedent” (2002). 
 
2. Malicious Obedience 
Davis points out that there are cases where an individual might claim to have been “just 
following the rules,” in defense of conduct. An example he provides is when an employee 
strictly follows the letter of the law in a way that is not punishable, but that results in 
harm or undesirable consequences for the employer; a deliberatively abusive 
interpretation of the rule. What Davis claims is missing from this interpretation of 
following the rules is “goodwill…anticipating the inability of general language to 
anticipate special cases,” or “trying to understand what the employer is trying to achieve 
by laying down such rules” (2002).  
 
 
 
  20 
3. Negligent Obedience 
Davis describes negligent obedience to be “a failure to exercise due care in following the 
relevant rules, whether the failure unreasonably risks harms to others or is in some other 
way faulty” (2002). In order to distinguish this interpretation from that of “stupid 
obedience,” Davis explains the subjective/objective nature inherent in negligent 
obedience. In this case, the actor must believe that they are acting obediently (or their act 
would be malicious), anticipating that their effort is sufficient to result in the desired 
outcome, thus subjectively obeying. However, the actor does not give interpreting the 
rule adequate attention, and ultimately their effort falls short. The actor has objectively 
disobeyed (2002), and therefore negligent obedience is always a failure to follow the rule. 
 
4. Stupid Obedience 
Davis likens stupid obedience to negligent obedience for “unconsciously failing to 
exercise due care in interpreting the rule,” but distinguishes stupid obedience as the actor 
simply not knowing better. He gives potential causes of not being able to skillfully 
interpret the rule, such as “lack of native wit, educational, or never having been taught 
how to interpret the rule in question” (2002). The most common example of stupid 
obedience regarding codes of ethics, according to Davis, is reading “each rule as if it 
were independent of others” (2002).  
 
5. Interpretive Obedience  
Unlike the other examples given so far, Davis qualifies interpretive obedience as 
following the rules, but credits it as a demonstration of just how complicated doing so is. 
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He uses the legal system, or legal documents, as an example, and the training lawyers 
receive, in that there are many methods for interpreting rules. One is to consider the 
context; how the rule fits with the others in the document in which it appears. Ultimately, 
there may be several defensible interpretations and no way to choose except to begin to 
look to other sources. While Davis acknowledges that a code of ethics is not likely to be 
as complicated as the laws of a legal system, he again reiterates the need for training in 
contextualizing and interpreting the principles found in a code of ethics (2002). 
 
All of these examples and Davis’ entire argument critically rests on interpretation. 
What Davis suggests is that given a well-written code, principlism, which requires the 
practical application of principles (and therefore also critically relies on interpretation), is 
a sufficient model to ensure ethical behavior within a professional society. But, it is 
exactly for his reliance on interpretation that I see Davis’ premise—that simply following 
the rules is primary over virtues—to be flawed. Perhaps clarity will come from better 
understanding the principles in question, and considering whether practically applying 
them (which involves balancing them with other moral obligations), requires mastering a 
skill or cultivating virtue. If it requires cultivation of a virtue, then virtue cannot be 
secondary, but must be at least coequal if not primary. 
 
COMMON PRINCIPLES IN RESEARCH ETHICS 
David Resnik is a bioethicist who is well-established and active in discussions 
that relate to philosophical, legal, and ethical issues having to do with science, technology 
and medicine. In a recent essay, Resnik, as the Vice-Chair for the National Institute of 
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Environmental Health Sciences professed the importance of ethics in research. In this 
piece, as well as in two of his books, The Ethics of Science, and Responsible Conduct of 
Research (co-authored with Adil Shamoo), Resnik provides a summary of principles that 
he has compiled from his study of common morality and values that promote good 
science. I compared his list with those proposed by several other scholars. Two of these 
references were meta-analyses of codes of ethics across scientific and research related 
societies. The other was the well-known work of Kristen Schrader-Frechette, Ethics of 
Scientific Research (1994). Below, I have included my own summary of the principles 
that I found to overlap between these four references. In particular, I emphasized 
principles that were not only the most common, but that are associated with character and 
virtue, as opposed to practical application.  All of the definitions I have provided come 
from Resnik’s 2015 essay, with the exception of fairness. This is because I found little, if 
any, discrepancy between his definitions and any others that were provided, and his 
provided adequate representation for any of the other definitions that I encountered. The 
definition for fairness, however, is my own, as I saw fairness to be the overlapping 
principle in a several other principles related to non-discrimination, respect for 
colleagues, responsible publication, animal care, and human rights protection. In all of 
these examples, the demand of the researcher is to judge best as to what is most fair and 
just. In the cases where there are multiple terms listed with a single definition, I chose to 
group them because the terms varied across sources, but the definitions overlapped. 
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Honesty & Truthfulness 
Strive for honesty in all scientific communications. Honestly report data, results, methods 
and procedures, and publication status. Do not fabricate, falsify or misrepresent data. Do 
not deceive colleagues, research sponsors or the public (Resnik, 2015)  
 
Fairness 
Strive for just, reasonable and dignified treatment all people, subjects and systems. 
Exercise impartial behavior, free from bias, without favoritism or discrimination in order 
to make decisions that are equitable and honorable for all affected.  
 
Carefulness 
Avoid careless errors and negligence; carefully and critically examine your own work 
and the work of your peers. Keep good records of research activities, such as data 
collection, research design and correspondence (Resnik, 2015). 
 
Social responsibility 
Strive to promote social good and prevent or mitigate social harms through research, 
public education and advocacy (2015). 
 
Integrity 
Keep your promises and agreements; act with sincerity; strive for consistency of thought 
and action (2015).  
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All of these principles are dependent on the character and virtues of the scientist, 
therefore I would argue that if these are the types of principles that are representative of a 
scientific research culture that is committed to integrity, then virtue and character must be 
coequal, if not primary to simply following the rules. To further examine whether 
principlism suffices as a sole and satisfactory framework for cultivating a culture of 
research integrity, in the following chapter I will turn to empirical studies that elucidate 
the concerns that scientists themselves report as the greatest threats to the overall 
integrity of scientific research. Given that principlism has become the preferred approach 
amongst research institutions for providing guidance for ethical behavior (Atkinson & 
Butler, 2012), overlap between the scientists’ concerns and the characteristics that I have 
listed here will further support my argument that principlism may have valuable 
attributes, such as I’ve discussed here, but is not by itself a sufficient framework to guide 
ethical behavior and create a research culture committed to integrity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SHORTCOMINGS OF CODES OF ETHICS 
 
A common critique of the efficacy of principle-based approaches in guiding ethical 
behavior is that this approach does not provide adequate guidance for ethical decision-
making, especially when the principles are in conflict with each other or in conflict with 
other moral obligations of the decision-maker (Resnik, 2012). Other critiques raise 
concerns as to whether there is a compelling reason for someone to obey moral aspects of 
a professional code, when there may be an immediate gain from bending or working 
around the rules. This is linked to the idea that even in situations where there are 
enforceable penalties, the motivator becomes fear, which is not a moral consideration 
(Kovac, 2014; Woodruff, 2001) and therefore does not motivate ethical behavior but a 
technical adherence to the rules at best. In the preceding chapter, I walked through a 
defense of principle-based approaches put forth by Michael Davis, in which aims to 
undermine these types of common criticisms by emphasizing the importance of 
interpretation (Davis, 2004).   
 However, as I concluded in the last chapter, I believe the premise of Davis’ 
argument to be flawed. Rather, I see his critical reliance on interpretation in order to 
follow the rules to actually emphasize the importance of the decision-maker’s moral 
character and virtue. Overlooking moral character and virtue only legitimizes concerns 
that there will be rule bending to maintain technical adherence to the relevant code. In 
order to give further consideration to the pros and cons of using codes of ethics and 
principle-based frameworks as the sole and satisfactory effort for guiding ethical 
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behavior, I found it necessary to gain perspective on the relationship between principle-
based approaches and moral misbehavior in scientific research. As such, I devote this 
chapter to discussing the findings from studies that qualitatively report on misbehavior 
that scientists perceive to be threatening to the overall integrity of the enterprise of 
science, as well as studies that quantitatively document the prevalence of these behaviors. 
Ultimately, I reason that given the widespread use of codes of ethics within scientific 
societies to guide ethical behavior, and the inclusion of integrity as a basic tenet of these 
codes, then a prevalence of behaviors that lack characteristics of integrity suggests that 
exclusive reliance on principle-based frameworks may be an insufficient approach for 
guiding ethical behavior and yielding a research culture committed to integrity. 
The studies I concentrate on here were conducted by Brian Martinson, Melissa 
Anderson and Raymond de Vries, and supported by the Research on Research Integrity 
Program, which is an Office of Research Integrity (ORI) and National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) collaboration. When the researchers recognized that scientists were seldom asked 
to contribute their perspective on what sort of behaviors are most threatening to research 
integrity, they were motivated to address this gap in knowledge. They sought to identify 
the types of misbehavior that take place in everyday research practice that threaten 
scientific integrity and the prevalence of these types of behaviors by interviewing 
scientists. Prior to their studies, the literature on misconduct or misbehavior within 
scientific practice disproportionately focused on the narrow definition of misconduct: 
falsification, fabrication and plagiarism (FFP), as defined by the U.S. Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP) in 2000 (Martinson et al., 2005).  However, on the 
periphery was an ongoing debate about the importance of Questionable Research 
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Practices (QRP), which are often treated as mundane in comparison to FFP but still pose 
a threat to scientific integrity; possibly a more significant threat. 
In 1992 the National Academy of Sciences released a report that links QRPs with 
the erosion of scientific integrity, and in 2002 the U.S. Office of Research Integrity (ORI) 
called for empirical evidence that would shed light on these types of behaviors and their 
prevalence. These calls were met with resistance by many groups, including the 
Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology, and the Association of 
American Medical Colleges, because they feared additional oversight and regulation 
could be the possible consequences of whatever was found (2005). Martinson et al. saw 
this to be a missed opportunity to properly understand the negative aspects of the research 
environment that extend well beyond FFP and compromise scientific integrity. This is 
especially regrettable considering that QRPs could have an even more destructive effect 
on integrity than for example, plagiarism, as QRPs may result in corrupted information 
and yet are subtle enough to go unnoticed. 
Martinson and his colleagues’ studies were the first to empirically document what 
these behaviors are according to scientists, and how common they are in practice (2005), 
and despite garnering much attention, their work still largely stands alone today. In one of 
their studies they conducted six focus groups with 51 scientists from major research 
universities (De Vries et al.  2006). At each participating institution, there were two focus 
groups, one consisting of only associate professors, and the other consisting of assistant 
professors and postdoctoral fellows. The participants also represented a broad range of 
academic disciplines in the biomedical, clinical, biological and behavioral sciences. And 
in the interest of keeping the discussions from gravitating towards context-specific issues, 
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the focus groups were intentionally assembled with participants from different 
departments. The researchers reported often hearing, “In my area, FFP is not the issue.” 
Instead, the participants echoed each other’s concerns that there are common problems 
that take place in the everyday practice of scientific research that may appear harmless 
but that are actually quite threatening to the integrity of the scientific enterprise (2006).  
The researchers categorized these “normal misbehaviors” into four contexts 
within which the behaviors occur: The Meaning of Data; The Rules of Science; Life with 
Colleagues; and The Pressures of Production in Science (2006). Importantly to my 
emphasis on the weight of moral character and virtue within science, the researchers 
concluded that these “everyday problems of scientists are often associated not just with 
ordinary human frailties, but with the difficulty of working on the frontier of 
knowledge…constantly being forced to improvise and negotiate standards of conduct” 
(2006). This demonstrates the exceptional capacity needed for moral decision-making 
within science. In Table 1, I have included the descriptions provided by the researchers 
for each category and sample commentary from respondents.  
 What quickly becomes evident in looking at the data featured in Table 1 is that 
there are circumstances within science that make “simply following the rules” anything 
but simple. Also demonstrated is that knowing the rules and technically adhering to the 
rules is seen by scientists as a daunting, even a prohibitive task. This again reinforces 
concerns about codes of ethics promoting, at best, technical adherence as opposed to 
ethical behavior. While there may be instances that seem easy to sympathize with, this is 
still all the more reason why the decision-maker’s moral character and virtue is 
important. Ultimately, individuals not only have to decide how and whether they follow 
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the rule, but why they follow the rule. I would argue that why (due to either moral 
reasoning or fear and compliance reasoning) has important implications for how and 
whether a rule is followed. Because of these implications, I see it as reasonable to 
consider moral character and virtue as critical factors in the equation. I do not suggest 
moral character is a cure-all, but it is important to properly acknowledge the influence 
that an individual’s disposition may have on why, and therefore whether and how rules 
are followed.   
In another study conducted by De Vries, Martinson and Anderson (2005), the 
research group set out to quantitatively assess how prevalent are a series of behaviors that 
may threaten scientific integrity. This study was carried out independently of the one that 
included focus groups, but around the same time.  In this quantitative study their group 
surveyed 3,247 early and mid-career US based scientists who were funded by the NIH. 
They asked the participants to report on their own behavior within the previous three 
years. As the researchers note, this was the first time that these behaviors had been 
measured quantitatively, so there is no way to contextualize the results (whether this has 
always been the case, or if these behaviors are related to the stresses of doing science 
today) other than realizing that at present, “mundane ‘regular’ misbehaviors present 
greater threats to the scientific enterprise than those caused by high-profile misconduct 
cases such as fraud” (Martinson, 2005).  For example, consider the possible impact of 
some of the mundane behaviors relating to the meaning of data. These practices fall 
somewhere in between ‘cleaning’ and ‘cooking’ data, and the result is data that may not 
be considered fraudulent, but aren’t accurate enough that the experiment could be 
reproduced, and are therefore misleading. If the data practices are outside the FFP criteria  
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Contexts for  Misbehavior Description Commentary
The Meaning of Data
"Problems with data that lie in the 'gray 
area' that arise from being too busy or 
from the difficulty of finding the line 
between 'cleaning' and 'cooking' data" 
(2006) 
"An external examiner came and had a look at 
some of my graphs. And he said, 'You know, well 
I'd be much more convinced by your data if you'd 
chopped off the last two data points…' But for me 
its about being honest about what you found 
and…my work may be more convincing had I 
lopped off the last two data points, but those last 
two data points may be more interesting than 
something that has happened before" (2006) 
The Rules of Science
"The work of scientists is increasingly 
goverened by layers of rules intended 
to, among other things, protect animal 
and human subjects, to prevent the 
misuse of grant funds, and to control 
the use of harmful materials. Our 
respondents noted that this plethora of 
rules...can actually generate 
misconduct" (2006)
"If you ask why the rules are being bent, it's in 
some cases because too many rules have been 
implemented that obstruct you from getting the 
necessary things done…there get to be so many 
rules that you're doing anything you can to dodge 
around those rules without totally stepping over the 
line" (2006)
Life with Colleagues
"Science is a social endeavor. Scientists 
must deal with their own and 
colleagues' frailties and find ways to 
negotiate relationships to sort out their 
responsibilities to each other"
(2006)
"In my field in particular [there are] innumerable 
instances where people are cooperating well until 
something really spectacular is found. And all of 
the sudden people are just lopped-off at the 
knees…literally on the day something is found, it 
just [starts] to crumble and...people just don't speak 
to each other anymore, or [are] trying to block 
publications" (2006)
Pressures of Production in 
Science
"Like other occupations, science 
requires its practitioners to come up 
with tangible products. The pressure to 
produce--coupled with uncertainties 
about ownership of ideas, the proper 
way to assess scientific output (quantity 
or quality?), the management of 
competing interests and the division of 
labor in research--is associated with a 
number of behaviors that do not quite 
reach the threshold of FFP but 
nevertheless are regarded by scientists 
as misconduct" (2006) 
"…a particular study that I am involved in is about 
drugs…to offset the effect of radiation…[The] 
company that makes [the] drug…does not want a 
certain conrol group in the study and will not fund 
the study if that control group is there…there's 
nothing illegal about [this], and I know for a fact 
that it happens all the time...because the 
government can't pony up enough money to do all 
the clinical research that needs to get done...could 
have started that study months ago if she'd just 
said, sure, I'll do whatever you want, give me the 
money" (2006)
Table 1: Normal misbehaviors, descriptions and samples of respondents' commentary (Sourced from De Vries et al. 2006).
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and go unnoticed then these behaviors are likely to only become more common and this 
could lead to an increase in production of misleading data that shape future research. This 
has implications that go beyond shaping or qualifying future research, and can have 
deleterious effects on all of the knowledge produced. These small, but real cumulatively 
corrosive effects can be recognized in all of the behaviors discussed here. The threat of 
these behaviors increases as they are overlooked, as failing to address them 
communicates a tolerance for them, which will further allow these misbehaviors to be 
anchored as status quo. 
In their second study (2005) Martinson et al. provided scientists with a list of 
behaviors and asked them to report on which behaviors the scientists had engaged in 
themselves within the past three years. The behaviors included in the survey were vetted 
through compliance officers at five major research universities and one independent 
research organization to determine which behaviors, if discovered, would likely be 
sanctionable at the institutional or governmental level. Table 2 lists the behaviors in 
ranked order with the ‘top ten’ as most serious and sanctionable. These included FFP, 
whereas the ‘other behaviors,’ may simply be classified as carelessness (2005).  Table 2 
also displays the percentage of respondents who reported engaging in the different 
behaviors within the past three years. Martinson et al. found that less than 2% of the 
participating scientists reported engaging in the top six behaviors, which included 
falsification and plagiarism. Interestingly, the frequencies for the remaining behaviors all 
exceed 5%, while most exceed 10%. All are behaviors lacking integrity. As a whole, 33% 
of the respondents reported engaging in at least one of the top ten behaviors within the 
past three years (2005). 
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Based on their findings, Martinson, Anderson and De Vries challenged that “the 
scientific community [could] no longer remain complacent about such behavior” (2005). 
Their criticism extends beyond the “few bad apples” framework, which focuses on the 
few individual cases that make headlines for FFP and operates under the assumption that 
these behaviors are based on individual traits and local (laboratory and departmental) 
contexts (2005). Instead, Martinson and his colleagues also confront the inadequacy of 
efforts to promote integrity solely through ‘responsible conduct of research’ 
programming. They assert that, while the focus of these efforts is more towards general 
scientific integrity, these efforts still “prioritize the immediate laboratory and 
departmental contexts of scientists’ work, and are typically confined to ‘fixing’ the 
behavior of individuals” (2005).  
 
  
  33 
 Martinson and colleagues conclude by advocating for more research in order to 
gain a greater understanding of relationship between inequities in the broader research 
environment and individual behaviors. They foreshadow observations from analyses that 
they had not yet published at the time that suggest when scientists perceive inequities 
within the broader research environment it is likely to negatively influence their 
individual behavior (2005). This reflection emphasizes the importance of integrity, and 
therefore moral character and virtue, not just at the individual level but also at the 
institutional level.  While this may have important implications for understanding that 
this problem of unethical behaviors is likely a system-wide problem, I want to remain 
focused on the evidence provided by these two studies. They demonstrate the a 
prevalence of behaviors that lack integrity, and that therefore are a threat to the integrity 
of the scientific enterprise. This finding does not suggest that all of the participants, or 
their colleagues, are corrupt and lack integrity altogether, or that the use of codes of 
ethics and principle-based frameworks completely fails to provide guidance in ethical 
decision-making. However, these findings provide reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
use of codes of ethics and principle-based frameworks aren’t quite sufficient for 
cultivating a research community committed to ethics, and begin to ask what else is 
needed.  
In the previous chapter, I explained that codes of ethics are valuable for many reasons, 
internal and external to a given research community. As I argued in that chapter, a 
professional community becomes a moral community sharing aspirations, values, and 
trainings. And as such its code of ethics is not only a resource for professional 
socialization, but also an explicit proclamation of these norms (Frankel 1989). These 
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studies by Martinson and his colleagues confirm that codes of ethics are doing well to 
proclaim a common set of norms and values. The problem does not seem to be that the 
researchers are unclear as to what types of behaviors warrant concern. This is 
substantiated by the overlap between the behaviors the participants identified and the 
tenets of honesty, fairness, carefulness, social responsibility, and truthfulness (all of 
which involve to integrity), that have been identified across a majority of scientific codes 
of ethics. These studies corroborate a shared desire for these moral characters and virtues 
within the research culture. These studies also demonstrate concern that these values are 
not being upheld in a satisfactory manner and scientists recognize that this poses a threat 
to the overall integrity of science. This illuminates the shortcomings of codes of ethics 
and principle-based approaches in guiding ethical behavior, in that such approaches 
seemingly result in technical adherence, but do not produce a research community that is 
committed to integrity. Perhaps this is so because a culture committed to integrity has 
more to do with virtue and character than adherence. Based on this conclusion I devote 
the next chapter to considering virtue ethics frameworks to gain perspective on how 
virtues ethics framing may be able to complement principle-based approaches and 
ameliorate these identified shortcomings.
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CHAPTER 4 
VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
The evidence that I have presented this far suggests that the sole reliance on a 
principle-based ethics framework and a code of ethics is not sufficient for cultivating a 
scientific research community that is committed to integrity. I devote this fourth chapter 
to better understanding virtue ethics frameworks in order to consider whether there may 
be a complementary role for virtue ethics to ameliorate the identified shortcomings of the 
status quo. I will start by providing some background information about virtue ethics 
(such as its genesis and its recent resurgence in popularity), and contrast the emphases of 
virtue ethics with two widely discussed ethical frameworks deontology, utilitarianism. 
Then I will focus the discussion on the concepts of telos, phronêsis as first developed by 
Aristotle, the ancient Greek scholar often credited as the father of virtue ethics. Although 
there are other contemporary scholars whose work would likely be valuable to this 
project, for sake of scope and limited space, I decided to focus on Aristotelian virtue 
ethics and commentaries provided by contemporary scholars. This is because Aristotelian 
concepts remain foundational in current discussions on virtue ethics, and also because 
virtue ethics offers concepts that immediately lend well to begin thinking about new 
approaches in cultivating a scientific research community committed to integrity.  
 
VIRTUE 
Not surprisingly, I’ve come across several definitions in the literature for virtue. 
There are intellectual virtues, which can be directly taught and learned, and there are 
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moral virtues, or virtues of character, that require habituation (Schafer-Landau, 2012). 
My focus for this thesis will be primarily on the cultivation of moral virtues, as honesty, 
fairness, carefulness, social responsibility, and truthfulness are more likely be categorized 
as moral virtues than intellectual. Virtues are somewhere in between the extremes of 
vices. For example the virtue of courage is a fulcrum point between the vices of 
recklessness and cowardice (Resnik, 2012). Moral virtues are cultivated, as they are 
habits developed over a lifetime of practice (Chen, 2015), that eventually become 
“dispositions which not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve…goods…but 
which also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good…” (MacIntyre, 2013). 
Learning to be virtuous cannot be learned from books, nor is it mindless emulation of 
virtuous people. Julia Annas describes this development process as having “a steep 
learning curve that is mastered (if at all) only with very extensive practice and 
experience” (Annas, 2012).  
 Virtue-based ethical frameworks, therefore build on and prioritize virtues of 
character, rather than moral rules of conduct. Whereas alternative ethical theories may 
define virtue as the result of conforming to fundamental moral rules, or just secondary in 
general, a virtue ethicist would argue that “actions are morally good…because they 
exemplify virtuous character traits—not because they conform to some already specified 
moral rule” (Schafer-Landau, 2012). This difference in emphases is particularly salient 
when comparing the three most widely discussed ethics frameworks at current: 
deontology, utilitarianism, and now more recently, virtue ethics. While all three provide 
normative guidance, each approaches gives guidance differently.  
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Deontology is generally associated with principle-based frameworks, which I 
have primarily focused on in the discussion so far, and which is the primary framework 
used within scientific research (Resnik, 2012; Hicks, 2016; Chen, 2015). This approach 
centers on following rules of behavior or duties (Resnik, 2012; Chen, 2015). In the 
context of scientific research, the primary goal would not be to develop scientists of good 
character or “to reconcile tensions between aims of practice and of other communal 
practices, but instead to specify ‘good science’ in terms of principles or rules to be 
followed” (Hicks, 2016). By now in this discussion, I have demonstrated that this is not a 
sufficient method for cultivating a research culture committed to integrity, which is 
presumed to be a widespread concern based on integrity being a basic tenet in all 
scientific societies’ codes of ethics. 
 With a utilitarian approach, an action is deemed to be virtuous or not based on the 
consequences of the action chosen as compared to the consequences of alternative actions 
that could have been taken (MacIntyre, 2013). This differs from virtue ethics in that 
virtue ethics places a priority on intention rather than outcome. From a utilitarian 
perspective, the emphasis on an action’s consequences is associated with maximizing 
well-being (Chen, 2015). However, both utilitarian and deontological approaches have 
been criticized for depersonalizing moral behavior and ignoring emotions in moral life by 
providing impetus (be it rule or consequence) for an individual to respond in a particular 
way regardless of circumstance or character. This is because “these theories have 
developed timeless and universal ways of approaching problems, at the expense of 
tending to their particular, concrete and timely details” (2015), much less tending to the 
moral qualities of one’s character. Virtue ethics have also received criticism, which I will 
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address and respond to later in this chapter. But now, with a bit of contextualization of 
how virtue ethics compares with other popular ethical frameworks, I will focus on the 
origin of Aristotelian virtue ethics and some signature concepts that provide insight to the 
shortcomings of principle-based frameworks and codes of ethics that I have identified. 
  
ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS  
 Virtue ethics is one of the oldest moral philosophies, having its origins in ancient 
Greek philosophy. Aristotle was among the first to discuss virtue ethics in his treatise 
Nicomachean Ethics, which he published in the fifth century BCE (Resnik, 2012; Chen, 
2015). Virtue ethics has enjoyed a comeback in popularity with contemporary 
philosophers, such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Edmund Pellegrino as of the 1970s and 
1980s (Resnik, 2012). Today, Aristotelian virtue ethics continue to be foundational for 
discussions of virtue-based approaches (Chen, 2015) and their value in relation to the 
professions. From an Aristotelian perspective, the moral agent’s character is central. In a 
quest to explain the relationship between human motivation and ethical conduct (Resnik, 
2012), the moral agent’s motivations, intentions and reasons for choosing a particular 
action (as opposed to the action itself), are accentuated.  
 In his discussion of virtue ethics, Aristotle places great concern on one’s telos 
over a lifetime, which is the goal of a person’s life.  This is because Aristotle sees telos as 
directly related to eudaimonia, which is best described as “the happiness that results from 
the state of being and doing well,” often translated as “human flourishing, well being, or 
true happiness” (Chen 2015, Hursthouse 2001). Telos is important in Aristotle’s 
framework because he argues that every action has a reason, whether it is for the action 
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itself or the anticipated outcome of an action. This results in a hierarchy of ends, with 
eudaimonia at the top of this hierarchy. However, eudaimonia, Aristotle claims, is just as 
much about the process one takes to reach it (Chen, 2015; Hicks, 2012; Hursthouse, 
1999). Therefore, in order for someone to reach their telos, they must work towards 
cultivating virtue, as it is through virtues that one achieves their telos. For example, if a 
scientist’s telos includes excellence in their scientific work, they must cultivate virtues 
that allow them to do excellent scientific work, such as virtues of integrity, which lead to 
reliable, reproducible and accurate knowledge production (Chen, 2015; Hicks, 2012). 
Importantly, while virtue demands some reliability of action, it also “affects the moral 
agent’s attitudes, emotions and responses towards virtue” (Chen, 2015).  Jiin-Yu Chen 
(2015) uses the example of honesty as one of several virtues essential for a scientist and 
explains the implications: 
…this would mean that not only would the scientist be scrupulous in 
designing experiments, collecting data and analyzing data in ways that 
yield reasonable interpretations, but also hold reservations about scientists 
who act counter to that, teach fledgling scientists how to cultivate honesty 
in science, recognize when issues of honesty arise in science help resolve 
them (2015, p. 80).  
 
However, Chen also explains that while Aristotle promotes all virtues as important, 
Aristotle underscores that the extent of their development will vary between persons and 
situations. Thus, depending on a person’s capabilities, resources and situation, what is a 
virtuous act for one may not be a virtuous act for another. Due to this variance, virtuous 
action demands that the moral agent recognizes a situation as one that requires virtue and 
then decides to act in a specific way because it is appropriate for the situation and for 
their character (Chen, 2015; Hursthouse, 1999). This capacity to assess and respond to 
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situations with authenticity and virtue draws on one of the four cardinal virtues, phronêsis 
(justice, temperance and courage are the other three) that Aristotle considers necessary 
for all human flourishing.  While phronêsis is an intellectual virtue, as opposed to a moral 
virtue, intellectual virtues help guide moral virtue. Phronêsis is translated simply as 
‘practical wisdom’ (Hursthouse, 2001) and is “necessary for enabling correct decisions 
and actions when confronted with many options; it is the ability to deliberate well” 
(Chen, 2015).  
With this understanding of phronêsis, I would now like to return to the identified 
shortcomings of principle-based frameworks. In particular I want to revisit the crucial 
reliance on interpretation within Davis’ defense of “just following the rules” (Davis, 
2002).  The research findings presented by DeVries, Martinson and Anderson (2005, 
2006) that I discussed in chapter 3 affirm that codes of ethics are beneficial for internally 
and externally communicating professional norms, or in other words, making the rules of 
engagement known. This was demonstrated by the overlap between the behaviors the 
participating scientists identified and the tenets of honesty, fairness, carefulness, social 
responsibility, and truthfulness—again, all of which relate to integrity—that have been 
identified across a majority of scientific codes of ethics. Also suggested by the 
quantitative dimension of these studies is that, given the prevalence of misbehaviors of 
these types, it is reasonable to challenge whether codes of ethics and principle-based 
frameworks suffice. I argue they do not because the character of the individual scientists 
and institutions are significantly neglected as a consequence of presuming that principle-
based frameworks are the optimal and effectively exclusive approach to cultivating a 
research culture committed to integrity. I see the crucial reliance on interpretation to be 
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the important factor that causes this model to fail in this way. This is because the 
expectation of interpretation to allow for appropriate rule following is analogous to the 
virtue of phronêsis. It is as if practical wisdom is an obvious and reasonable and 
expectation for scientists, yet there is little formal attention given to the cultivation of 
their character.  Given this, I echo others working in this area and propose phronêsis as a 
fundamental virtue for a scientist; especially when the telos of a scientist is to participate 
in a scientific community that is ideally committed to integrity (Chen, 2015; Hursthouse, 
2001; Hicks, 2016).  
Adapting this perspective and recognizing that the current principle-based 
approach using codes of ethics requires augmentation is only a first, yet important 
step. How to apply virtue ethics theory and cultivate such a culture warrants 
additional research and cultural transformation. Before imagining how all of this 
may apply within an ethics-based research network, I must first address some of 
the common criticisms of virtue ethics.  
 
CRITIQUES AND COUNTERPOINTS 
A first criticism has to do with the diversity of cultural norms that influence how 
individuals and communities understand good and virtuous. This concern in combination 
with the virtue ethicist’s rejection of the notion that there are ultimate ethical principles 
applicable to all people in all situations seemingly bolsters the idea that a virtue-ethicist 
must therefore embrace ethical relativism (Schafer-Landau, 2012). However, Martha 
Nussbaum responds to this criticism by asserting that this is not only a “wrong lesson to 
take from the facts of cultural pluralism,” but she explains that “Aristotle’s conception of 
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the virtuous life is rooted in an appreciation of various universal features of the human 
experience” (Nussbaum, 1988). She argues that Aristotle connects virtues with “a search 
for ethical objectivity and with the criticism of local norms.” She claims he does so by 
examining spheres of universal human experience that relate to life as a human being, 
regardless of time and space, in which individuals must make choices provided 
alternatives, and choose a particular action over others (2012). In each case these 
universal spheres of experience fix concepts of virtue. For example, no matter how a 
culture understands death, all human beings will face it. The body provides another 
universal sphere, in that regardless of culture, prior to any cultural experience the human 
body ensures universal limitations and frailties that guarantee a great deal of overlap. 
Nussbaum gives examples of hunger, thirst, and desire. Death and the human body are 
just two of several examples of universal spheres, but enough for the scope of this thesis 
to establish that at least an Aristotelian virtue-ethics framework does not reduce to ethical 
relativism.  
 A contrasting critique of virtue ethics frameworks is the rejection of ethical 
monism. For example, utilitarian frameworks give impartial concern for happiness, 
whereas fairness is central in deontology. Virtue ethicists see the primary emphasis of 
these elements as only being possible at the expense of others, and defend that virtue 
ethics can give importance to these elements and others, without giving any one element 
moral priority (Schafer-Landau, 2012). The criticism of this approach, interestingly or 
ironically to this thesis discussion, is that virtue ethics fails to give sufficiently concrete 
guidance to how one ought to behave. This criticism is well addressed by Rosalind 
Hursthouse (2013), and Julia Annas (2013). Both point out that virtue ethics will “not 
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yield a set of precise recommendations that can be applied without any moral judgment at 
all” (Hursthouse, 2013) and argue that not only is this aspiration misguided, but that 
deontology and utilitarianism also cannot. Annas likens this expectation to someone 
(presumably an adult with full capacity for reasoning) always doing what their mother 
told them. She condemns this as an “immature, abdication of responsibility” and reasons 
that a moral decision-making procedure replacing the mother in this scenario would be no 
better (Annas, 2013). She further explains that what is right for a virtuous person may not 
be right for a moral learner who is in a relatively early phase of attaining practical 
wisdom—“what is appropriate for the master may be ill advised for the novice” (2013). 
Hursthouse adds another dimension by challenging that the aim of a virtue ethics 
framework is to balance options, those “that generate some amount of happiness” and 
those that “lessen the amount of misery in the world” (Hursthouse, 2013).  
 Another common worry about virtue ethics is the central role of character, and 
how this may confuse moral assessment (Schafer-Landau, 2012). This anxiety comes 
from the thought that a virtue ethicist might declare an act to be morally right if and only 
if it is undertaken by a person who is virtuous. This would welcome the assumption that 
it would be impossible for a virtuous person to behave immorally (Slote, 2013). This 
understanding, that the right action is defined as an action that a virtuous person would 
do, suggests that a virtuous person can do anything they please and still be in the right. 
However, this is not quite the virtue ethicist’s argument. As Michael Slote contends, 
“actions done by virtuous people, from virtuous motives are indeed morally right, even if 
they have disastrous consequences” (2013). He supports this logic by further explaining 
his view that this does not mean that any action taken by a virtuous person is morally 
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right. Consequently, virtuous people can act out of character. Slote defends that the virtue 
ethicist’s emphasis is on whether the individual’s motives exemplify virtue (2013).   
 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have provided contextualization of virtue ethics, specifically 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, and expanded on concepts of telos and phronêsis, 
demonstrating their relevance to the practice and practitioners of science. I have argued 
that phronêsis is a fundamental virtue for a scientist to cultivate throughout their training 
and career, and principle-based frameworks overlook this need, perhaps by mistaking 
interpretation as a trainable skill rather than a cultivated intellectual virtue that will 
further guide the development of a practitioner’s moral virtues. The overlap between the 
failures of principle-based approaches and the merits of virtue-based approaches justifies 
giving more thought to how to effectively augment a principle-based approach with 
concepts, such as telos and phronêsis from virtue ethics. Now that I have also walked 
through some of the most common concerns about virtue-ethics approaches and provided 
responses to these concerns, I will devote the following chapter to imagine how all of this 
may apply within an ethics-based research network aimed at addressing the unique 
ethical dimensions presented by international health research that is based in resource-
restricted countries. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH RESEARCH 
 
Up until now, I have devoted much of this thesis to discussing questionable 
research practices that all in some respect reflect violations of integrity. The studies I 
have focused on so far, whether meta-analyses of scientific societies’ codes of ethics 
(Komíc 2015), or empirical studies on behaviors that scientists perceive as threats to 
scientific integrity (Martinson et al. 2006), have all been situated within the context of 
U.S. funded research and focused on American scientific societies. Drawing from these 
examples, I have determined that not only is there an overarching desire and expectation 
for integrity in U.S. scientific research, but that honesty, fairness, carefulness, social 
responsibility, and truthfulness have become normative values that factor significantly 
into this concept of integrity. Furthermore, I have argued that upholding these values 
requires something greater than technical adherence, and requires the cultivation of moral 
character and virtue. I have supported this claim by demonstrating that while codes of 
ethics and principle-based frameworks are effective measures for codifying, and then 
internally and externally proclaiming these values, they may not be sufficient measures 
for upholding these values. I provided ample support in the preceding chapter to argue 
that concepts rooted in virtue-based ethics frameworks, such as telos and the cultivation 
of virtues—specifically the virtue of phronêsis—deserve serious consideration in 
conceiving how to ameliorate the shortcomings of principlism with regard to fostering a 
research community committed to integrity.  
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However, let us treat collaborations, scientific practices, and research activities 
between scientific researchers in developed, affluent countries, such as the U.S., (which I 
have focused on for this project) as one of two contexts to consider. I would like to now 
introduce a second context to demonstrate a need for the cultivation of ethical virtues in 
scientific research. This context encompasses international health research ethics, 
particularly involving resource-restricted and disease-endemic countries. Due to power 
and resource asymmetries, which I expand upon in this chapter, I will show that this 
international context is even more fraught than the former context with complexities and 
ethical considerations. Upon doing so, I also intend to demonstrate how virtue ethics 
framing is beneficial and needed in both U.S. and international health research contexts.  
 In this chapter I will draw from current discussions surrounding international 
infectious disease research collaborations aimed at combatting infectious disease 
outbreaks to provide background information on the social and ethical challenges of this 
type of work. After highlighting issues that scientists and bioethicists working in the 
global health sphere consider of greatest concern, I will justify the need for, and display 
the fundamental aspirations of a developing initiative that I am part of, which include 
cultivating ethical virtues within a specific research community. This initiative is an 
ethics-based cooperative research network that not only aspires to improve upon the 
questionable research practices that are prevalent among U.S. based research 
collaborations and that I have described in preceding chapters, but also responds to the 
types of concerns I present in this chapter. These concerns relate to international health 
research in resource restricted settings. I focus here on practices that have become known 
as “parachute” research practices (Heymann et al., 2015), which include issues related to 
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data sharing, unequal treatment and absence of partnerships with local researchers, and 
neglect for increasing local scientific capacity. I will also touch on the implications of 
competition in scientific discovery (and how this relates to telos).  To keep the 
conversation timely, I relate this discussion to the the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak 
of 2014, and the current spread of Zika virus (ZIKV) across Latin American into the U.S.  
 
PARACHUTE SCIENCE AND VIOLATIONS OF INEGRITY   
While there are many targets for blame in the case of EVD 2014 and ZIKV, the 
aspects most relevant to this project are the characteristic failures of the scientific 
researchers involved. In particular, I am referring to the parachutist research practices, 
which I have already touched on in the introduction of this thesis. My focus now is to 
discuss the implications of such practices and demonstrate how the three main practices 
of parachute science—issues related to data sharing, unequal treatment and absence of 
partnerships with local researchers, and neglect for increasing local scientific capacity—
violate integrity when the concept of integrity is understood to include virtues of honesty, 
fairness, carefulness, social responsibility, and truthfulness. As I detailed in chapter 2, I 
derived this concept of integrity from studying basic tenets of scientific societies’ codes 
of ethics in U.S. research. I further vetted this concept by observing consensus among 
U.S. researchers as to the types of behaviors that warrant concern for being threats to 
overall integrity of the scientific enterprise. I argue here that the prevalence of parachutist 
research practices and the growing number of U.S. scientists now speaking out against 
these parachutist behaviors provides similar rationale for examining these behaviors 
using the same standards of integrity.  
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The first parachute practice that I mentioned has to do with data sharing, or lack 
thereof. While the justification for not sharing or in some cases not even gaining 
permission for collecting virus specimens and data is not clearly understood, the 
implications of these behaviors are fairly well understood. When time is a factor, as it 
always is in an infectious disease outbreak, it is unequivocally true that the speeds of 
knowledge production and dissemination have crucial effects on the ultimate death tolls, 
as well as on humanitarian, social, economic and security devastation. As such, the 
practice of sequestering virus specimens or data under these circumstances, with these 
very high stakes, may be reasonably seen as a violation of integrity. This is with regard to 
qualities of honesty and truthfulness, fairness, and social responsibility. These practices 
lack honesty and truthfulness, as crucial information (whether data or virus specimens) is 
being collected and exported without proper permission, then kept undisclosed despite 
need or request. They are perceivably unfair as these practices do not appear to show just, 
reasonable and dignified treatment of all people, subjects and systems, nor does the 
decision to steal or conceal data so seem to be equitable or honorable for all who are 
affected. These behaviors also appear to fail to promote social good or show concern for 
public education or advocacy, and therefore do not uphold social responsibility. Perhaps 
these behaviors may also be considered a violation of carefulness depending on the 
defense of why the data is kept private (for example, questionable handling, poor record 
keeping, etc. which would be the result of lacking carefulness). 
The second parachute practice that I mentioned relates to the mistreatment of 
local research scientists. This may manifest as complete absence of partnership, where 
foreign scientists arrive and perform their research in isolation; or as inequitable 
  49 
treatment of the locals, when foreign researchers exploit the local researchers for access 
to local institutions and trust of the local populations. In either case, these practices can 
be argued to violate fairness and social responsibility because these actions are counter to 
promoting social good. These actions show no concern for public education and 
advocacy, nor could this type of research be considered as preventative or a means for 
mitigating social harms. Furthermore, neglect or exploitation of the local researchers is 
unfair, as it does not offer just, reasonable and dignified treatment all people, subjects and 
systems, nor does the decision to do so seem to be equitable or honorable for all who are 
affected. Rather, this mistreatment of local researchers displays bias, and favoritism, 
possibly even discrimination.  
Tangled with these practices is the failure to increase local scientific capacity, and 
the apparent lack of concern for disseminating research results or developing solutions 
that aid the most severely affected. These practices ultimately leave the locals vulnerable 
and ill-prepared to combat future outbreaks, given that it is not a question of whether a 
future outbreak will occur, but when. Furthermore, these practices especially call the 
motives of foreign researchers into question. Why are they there? If it isn’t to contribute 
towards the development of solutions that aid the most severely affected, then their 
engagement may appropriately be considered manipulative. As such, these practices can 
also be rationally perceived as a violation of integrity for being unfair and socially 
irresponsible. These practices can be seen as unfair for not considering or treating all who 
are affected with honor and equity. In failing to promote social good, and for failing to 
show concern for public education or advocacy these practices do not uphold social 
responsibility.  
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While all of these practices violate integrity, as with my conclusions about the 
Martinson et al. studies I presented in chapter 3, I am not suggesting that all of the 
scientific researchers, or their colleagues who engaged in parachutist practices are corrupt 
and lack integrity altogether. I also want to clarify, that there is need for and merit in 
researchers arriving in disease endemic countries with the aim of intervening. However, 
the practices I have discussed here don’t benefit the local people or the outbreaks, so 
much as these practices exploit the locals as an interesting object of study. Furthermore, I 
am not arguing that the codes of ethics and principle-based frameworks completely fail to 
provide guidance in ethical decision-making in either case. However, what is made 
evident when exploring the concept of integrity in either of these contexts, U.S. based 
research or international health research, is the lack of connection between theory and 
practice. I do not presume to understand entirely why this disconnect exists, as surely it is 
quite complex and probably situational. Nonetheless, I do see that the ethical challenges 
across both contexts—whether considered separately or collectively—provide reasonable 
grounds to begin to treat the use of codes of ethics and principle-based frameworks (with 
a critical reliance on interpretation) as not sufficient for yielding researchers and a 
research community that act with integrity, and begin to ask what else is needed. 
Frustrated by what he perceived to have become the status quo—ethically and 
logistically—for affluent countries (such as the U.S.) in combatting the spread of 
infectious disease in resource-restricted countries, Dr. Joseph Blattman began to do just 
that. 
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ETHICS BASED COOPERATIVE RESEARCH NETWORK 
In response to his frustrations, Blattman proposed an infrastructure for an ethics-
based cooperative research network. He envisioned the establishment of a multinational, 
inter-institutional, interdisciplinary research collaborative network, ideally ahead of a 
funded project or a disease outbreak, that would be devoted to preventing the spread of 
emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases throughout the Americas. His goal was to 
develop and implement practical and systematic responses to counteract some of the 
functional obstacles that can lead to parachutist research practices. Creating this would 
provide pathways for interested parties to contribute and collaborate in short and long 
term interventions.  
His initial plan was to start by building partnerships between ASU and resource 
restricted research sites across Central and South America, and to leverage ASU 
resources to increase the local scientific capacity of these disease endemic sites. For 
example, with little effort or cost incurred, Latin American collaborators could be 
sponsored and appointed as ASU adjunct faculty, therefore gaining access to journals and 
information that they otherwise don’t have but would significantly benefit from. Also, 
ASU is increasingly proficient at developing education and training models that allow for 
exchange of students, faculty and research staff between institutions.  Co-training and 
exchange is not only useful for growing scientific expertise, but also the time inevitably 
spent exposed to various cultural settings could promote understanding and respect for 
cultural differences, which helps to establish trust, a crucial element in productive 
collaboration. Furthermore, as all members become more culturally understanding these 
relationships will become increasingly dynamic, and ideally inspire new ways of thinking 
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and innovating, resulting in the development of novel solutions that are effective and 
sustainable for the those most severely affected. In addition to preemptively establishing 
partnerships, committing to increasing local scientific capacity, and working to develop 
solutions that benefit the populations most affected, Blattman was committed to having 
infrastructure and systems in place that would allow for efficient data and virus specimen 
sharing—ahead of publication. This not only includes ensuring security, storage capacity 
and access, but developing and implementing best practices so that whatever is shared is 
actually useful for the network members.  
But these practical and systematic responses are essentially blue prints for 
establishing quick and relatively easy access by stakeholders to a lot of interesting data, 
and Blattman recognized that good intentions weren’t enough to prevent the exploitation 
of the resource-restricted researchers and populations. Based on this he felt strongly that 
for this to really be done “right,” it all must be founded on an ethical framework with the 
aim of cultivating a research community that was profoundly committed to integrity. 
Only then could legitimate trust and partnership be built, and power imbalances among 
constituents be redressed. His first inclination was to develop a code of ethics, “but with 
teeth.”  
As I reported in the first half of this thesis, there are value and purpose in 
instituting principle-based approaches and codes of ethics in scientific research 
communities. However, the extent of that value has to do with the collaborative exercise 
of determining the virtues and norms of the given community, and then internally and 
externally proclaiming those norms. This in itself is invaluable and necessary. So there 
are benefits, which I further discussed in chapter 2, that are indeed meaningful. However, 
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as I demonstrated in both of the contexts that I defined for this project (within U.S. 
research collaborations and within international health research that involves resource 
restricted sites), there is rarely a black and white choice when working on the frontiers of 
knowledge. I discussed in chapters 3 & 4 that despite multiple levels of influence—
Declaration of Helsinki (international), the Common Rule (national), Institutional Review 
Boards (institutional) and code of ethics (scientific society), all of which call for 
integrity—there are still concerns that violations of integrity are prevalent and pose 
greater and greater threat to the overall integrity (internally and externally) of the 
scientific enterprise. Recognizing that by and large these violations are not a problem of 
inconsistency between norms and values or of technical adherence, but failures of moral 
character and virtue, I turned to virtue ethics to seek corrective measures to ameliorate 
the shortcomings of principle-based approaches and codes of ethics.  
 
VIRTUE ETHICS 
In chapter 4 I investigated concepts of virtue ethics that offered alternative 
framing for examining the moral dimensions of scientific work, appreciating that 
comprehending and upholding normative values and morals in the practice of scientific 
research requires more than technical adherence. Broadly, I found the concepts of telos, 
and the cultivation of virtues, to offer promising countermeasures to the deficits of 
technical adherence. I focused on the virtue of phronêsis, which is “necessary for 
enabling correct decisions and actions when confronted with many options; it is the 
ability to deliberate well” (Chen, 2015). I propose that this virtue is fundamental to the 
integrity of science in both U.S. and international contexts. This is because scientific 
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integrity not only has implications internal to the practice of science, but unavoidably 
also has implications based on whether scientific endeavors have positive or negative 
impacts, and who benefits verses who doesn’t. This is acutely problematic in the context 
of international health research. For example, does the disease endemic population 
benefit from the research done on their virus specimens, or does the scientist benefit from 
having interesting objects of study (in this case specimens from the disease afflicted) but 
has no plan or perhaps no intention of benefitting the local populations. To fall back on 
the well-known narrative that any discovery that advances science (therefore advances a 
career) is contribution enough is unsatisfactory in these circumstances, as knowledge 
production is only useful when it leads to solutions in high stakes situations such as the 
ones I have discussed in this chapter.  
Given the importance of end goals and how powerful they are in shaping 
outcomes, I have argued that the concept of telos is just as fundamental as the cultivation 
of virtues. This is because they are dependent on one another. Remember, if a scientist’s 
telos includes excellence in their scientific work, they must cultivate virtues that allow 
them to do excellent scientific work, such as virtues of integrity, which leads to reliable, 
reproducible and accurate knowledge production (Chen, 2015; Hicks, 2012). The 
cultivation of phronêsis is instrumental in the scientist becoming a moral learner who 
deliberates well and therefore acts with integrity. This would be a good internal to the 
practice of science, as it advances science. However, if a scientist’s telos places a greater 
priority on career status and financial reward, then these goals are focused on goods 
external to the practice of science. This means these are goods that can be obtained 
whether you are a scientist or not, benefitting the scientist but not necessarily science. For 
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example, sequestering data during an infectious disease outbreak in order to maintain a 
competitive advantage for publication prioritizes the individual’s career status while 
slowing overall scientific process at a crucial time. The goods of these goals are external 
to science and may actually be detrimental to science. In any case science, as an endeavor 
or practice, is a means to an end and whether that end is a good that is internal or external 
to science must be decided by the individual practitioner. Either way, as I have shown 
here, that choice has implications beyond the individual.  
While I have used parachutist research practices as an example of pursuing goods 
external as opposed to internal to science, for clarification, I do not presume to know why 
scientists are engaging in parachutist practices. Furthermore, I am not arguing that it is 
always right to choose one type of goods as opposed to the other. I have argued here that 
these actions are violations of integrity and consequently yield effects on the overall 
integrity of science with regard to reputation and outcomes. This realism underpins the 
uncertain and morally complex nature of doing scientific research, and further supports 
my argument that the cultivation of ethical virtues in scientific research is imperative. I 
have shown here, in this thesis that while there may be multiple levels in which standards 
of conduct are communicated, and given that a call for integrity (understood to include 
basic tenets such as honesty, fairness, carefulness, social responsibility, truthfulness) is 
found in all of these, it is fair to say that there is a significant disconnect between theory 
(codes of ethics) and practice. Thus, principle-based frameworks and codes of ethics, 
with a critical reliance on interpretation, are not a sufficient approach for cultivating 
ethical virtues within a research community, and ethical virtues are important. However, I 
have shown that there are concepts from virtue ethics, namely telos and the cultivation of 
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phronêsis, that may be promising in developing corrective forces to mend this disconnect. 
This warrants a more in-depth exploration of virtue ethics, with the aim of deciding on 
best approaches for applying these concepts and augmenting the principle-based 
approaches already in place. 
  57 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis project was inspired by a call to research and develop an ethical 
framework upon which to found a cooperative research network that would be aimed at 
combatting the spread of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases in resource-
restricted countries, specifically throughout Latin America. After considering what would 
be the ideal ethical framework to found this network on, with the expectation of 
cultivating a research community that is committed to integrity, I have concluded that 
there is merit in both principle-based approaches and virtue-based approaches, and a 
blend of the two approaches would be ideal.  
This is based on my conclusion that principle-based frameworks and codes of 
ethics, with a critical reliance on interpretation, is not a sufficient approach for cultivating 
ethical virtues within a research community, and ethical virtues are important. Where 
there is value in principle-based approaches and codes of ethics is in the collaborative 
exercise of determining the virtues and norms of the network, and then internally and 
externally proclaiming those norms. Virtue-based approaches offer concepts such as telos 
and the cultivation of phronêsis, that may be promising in developing corrective forces to 
mend the disconnection between theory (representing the ideal conduct proclaimed in 
codes of ethics) and practice (representing actual practice, which I have shown does not 
always align with norms and values) that I have discussed in this thesis. Telos is 
important because in any case, science is a means to an end, and it is necessary for the 
individual researcher (as well as the research institution, which I have not discussed here 
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but is also significant) to consider their end goals. Recognition and accountability that 
end goals affect outcomes is crucial. If a scientist’s (or institution’s) telos prioritize status 
and financial rewards over scientific integrity, it is likely that there will be implications 
on the quality of research conducted and products produced. The cultivation of phronêsis 
would be instrumental in the scientist becoming a moral learner that deliberates well and 
is therefore best equipped to act with integrity in all situations.   
There are many directions to go from here. In this thesis I have focused on the 
individual researcher, but that was purely for the scope of this project. I made references 
earlier on to the multitude of complicated factors that influence how and ultimately why 
individuals act in the ways that they do. The multifaceted nature of these challenges 
demands a greater study of systematic, institutional and pedagogical influences in order 
to prescribe any meaningful interventions or solutions. I presume at current that many of 
these aspects are being considered, but perhaps in isolation. I am interested in becoming 
familiar with these different orientations and considering all of these elements together in 
order to think about next steps. There are already institutional (Office of Research 
Integrity, Institutional Review Boards, charters, etc.) and pedagogical (bioethics courses, 
Responsible Conduct in Research, etc.) resources that have been developed and are in 
effect, and my aim here is not to discredit the work being done via these efforts. What I 
am interested in better understanding is what else needs to be done, because what I have 
shown here is that there are research practices that are threatening to the integrity of the 
scientific research enterprise and becoming increasingly common despite the efforts 
already in place.  All of this warrants further research to identify where additional 
attention should be given and determine best approaches for applying these concepts and 
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augmenting the principle-based approaches largely in place. I am excited to continue this 
work while I pursue a PhD in the Human and Social Dimensions of Science and 
Technology program at ASU. 
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